After a security incident, the first question is "what happened?". The audit log only answers it if the log is complete and nobody could have changed it. If the logs sit in the workload account, an attacker with admin access there can stop the trail and delete the evidence. A SOC 2 or ISO 27001 auditor asks the same thing: how do you know these logs were not altered?
Put the audit trail in an account that workload administrators cannot touch. Then lock the log files so that account cannot delete them early either.
An organization trail records API activity in every account and picks up new accounts automatically. Register the Log/Security account as the CloudTrail delegated administrator and create the trail from there, so nobody has to sign in to the management account.
aws cloudtrail validate-logs then shows whether a log file was modified or deleted after deliveryManagement events already include Amazon Bedrock InvokeModel and Converse calls. Agent and knowledge base calls such as InvokeAgent and Retrieve are data events. CloudTrail records those only if you add an event selector, and it charges extra.
Turn on S3 Object Lock in compliance mode with a default retention period. Until the period ends, no user can delete or overwrite a log file or shorten its retention. That includes the root user of the Log/Security account. Take the period from your retention policy. PCI DSS, for example, asks for 12 months of audit history.
You cannot undo compliance mode. Try the retention period in governance mode first. If you lock 10 years by mistake, you pay for 10 years of storage.
Figure: Test the retention period in governance mode before you switch to compliance mode
Only two accounts can change the trail: the Log/Security account and the management account. Block the first with an SCP that denies cloudtrail:StopLogging, cloudtrail:DeleteTrail, cloudtrail:UpdateTrail and cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors. See Do you use service control policies as guardrails in AWS? SCPs do not apply to the management account, which is why Do you keep your AWS management account empty?
Make the Log/Security account the delegated administrator for these services, so findings from every account land next to the logs.
Bedrock model invocation logging is off by default. It stores full prompts and responses, which helps an investigation but also keeps any personal or confidential data users send. Decide either way, and record the reason in your risk register.
Put every log source in the central bucket from the start, each under its own prefix. The Microsoft Sentinel AWS S3 connector reads from a bucket, so you can connect it later without moving anything. See Do you send AWS logs to Microsoft Sentinel?